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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 17234 
NATHAN J. HILL, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was convicted on two counts of burglary 
in violation of Section 76-6-202, Utah Code Annotated (1953), 
as amended, pursuant to a plea of admission made in the Third 
District Juvenile Court in Utah County on the 30th day of 
January 1980, the Honorable Merrill L. Hermansen, judge 
presiding. Specifically the charge was unlawfully remaining 
in a building with the intent to commit theft. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On April 16, 1980 appellant made a motion to 
withdraw and change his plea of admission, on the sole ground 
that he entered the admission without the assistance of counsel. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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His motion was denied on May 20, 1980 by Judge Hermansen. 
On the same date Judge Hermansen ordered appellant to pay 
$50.38 and committed him to the Youth Development Center. 
However, the cornrnittment was stayed on the condition that 
appellant take a job and pay $100 per month restitution. 
In addition, appellant was placed in the control of the 
Division of Family Services. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of appellant's 
conviction, as well as affirmance of the Order denying the 
motion to withdraw appellant's plea of admission. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At the outset it must be noted that the proceedings 
on January 30, 1980, when the appellant's plea of admissi~ 
was made and entered, was not recorded and thus no transcript 
of those proceedings is available for this appeal. Rather, 
the juvenile court judge has provided a memorandum dated June ' 
1980, recounting what occurred at the proceedings. The record 
on appeal contains this merr.orandum, certain minute entries 
of the court, the court's findings of fact and decree, the 
juvenile court petition, and the appellant's motion for change 
of plea accompanied by an affidavit of the appellant's father,, 
and from these documents the following statement of facts 
is made: 
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On January 30, 1980, appellant, accompanied by 
his father and his probation officer, came before Judge 
Hermansen in the Third Judicial Juvenile Court pursuant 
to charges that he had remained in the offices of or. 
Robert J. Peterson and Dr. Larry J. Broadbent with the 
intent to commit theft in violation of Section 76-6-202, 
Utah Code Code Annotated (1953), as amended. The charges 
against appellant were read and explained. Although the 
exact title and section of the Utah Code was not read orally 
at the proceedings, appellant and his father were previously 
made aware of the title and section of the Utah Code charged 
in the summons, which had been previously served on them. 
Judge Hermansen informed appellant and his father that 
appellant had a right to consult with counsel before entry 
of the plea, and that the charges against appellant were 
very serious. Appellant indicated that he did not wish to 
consult legal counsel. The judge then asked the appellant's 
father whether he felt that the decision to waive the right 
to legal counsel was a good and prudent decision and the 
father expressly supported the decision. The judge did not 
instruct the appellant as to the possible consequences of 
pleading an admission to the charge but again advised that 
it was a very serious charge. Eased upon these facts, the 
judge concluded that the right to counsel had been knowingly 
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waived and accepted the plea of admission. 
On April 16, 1980, appellant filed a motion for 
change of plea on the sole ground that he had entered his 
admission without the assistance of counsel. In an affidavit 
of appellant's father, attached to the motion, it was alleged 
that the father understood the charges to be in the nature of 
a trespass rather than burglary based on conversations he h~ 
earlier had with appellant's probation officer and that 
admission t6 the charge with other charges was necessary in 
order to clear the record and place appellant in the "Tracke: 
Program." The father further alleged that based on this 
understanding, he advised his son to admit all of the charges. 
The father finally alleged that after the January 30, 1980 
hearing, he discovered the evidence in the case and believed 
that his son did not commit burglary but rather criminal 
trespass. After a hearing on this motion, Judge Hermansen 
denied the motion on May 20, 1980, having concluded that he 
had fully advised appellant and his father of their rights 
to an attorney and that they had knowingly waived the right 
to counsel prior to entering the admission to the charge. 
The Court then entered an order that appellant pay $50.38 
restitution and that he be committed to the Youth Developmen: 
Center with that order stayed on the condition he take a job 1 
d th t appell'I and pay $100.00 a month towards restitution, an a 
I 
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I 
be placed in the care, custody, control and guardianship 
of the Division of Family Services for appropriate placement. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DUE PROCESS DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT AN 
INDIGENT JUVENILE BE AFFORDED COUNSEL 
IN A DELINQUENCY PROCEEDING WHICH 
DOES NOT RESULT IN HIS CONFINEMENT. 
The sole issue raised by appellant on appeal is 
that the waiver of his right to counsel prior to the entry 
of his plea of admission was neither voluntarily nor intel-
ligently made and therefore the juvenile court erred in 
denying his motion to withdraw the admission. 
Respondent submits that since appellant did not 
receive a sentence of incarceration as a result of his plea 
of admission, he may not be heard to complain that he was 
denied his right to counsel at the juvenile court proceedings. 
A juvenile's right to counsel in a delinquency 
proceeding was established in In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 
S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 528 (1967). The Gault decision 
followed two Supreme court decisions, which established that 
defendants in criminal proceedings charged with capital crimes 
or felonies have a constitutional right to be represented 
by counsel. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 s.ct. 55, 
77 L.Ed. 158 (1932); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 
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s.ct. 729, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). However, the scope of a 
juvenile's right to counsel in a delinquency proceeding 
was limited by Gault to proceedings where there is a risk 
of confinement. The Court in Gault stated: 
We conclude that the Due Proc-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment requires that in respect of pro-
ceedings to determine delinquency which 
may result in commitment to an institu-
tion in which the juvenile's freedom is 
curtailed, the child and his parents must 
be potified of the child's right to be 
represented by counsel retained by them, 
or if they are unable to afford counsel, 
that counsel will be appointed to repre-
sent the child. 875 S.Ct. 1451. 
The direction that this area of the law has taken 
in criminal proceedings in recent years establishes a pattern' 
which is helpful in determining the scope of a juvenile's 
right to counsel. In the case of Argersinger v. Hamlin, 401 
U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972), the Supreme 
Court extended the right to counsel to any criminal proceedinc 
where the defendant may be incarcerated. However, Argersi~ 
appeared to leave open the question of whether an indigent 
in a criminal proceeding had a right to counsel where: he was 
not, in fact, incarcerated. This question was answered~ 
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 99 S.Ct. 1158, 59 L.Ed.2d 
383 (1979). In Scott, the defendant was convicted of theft. 
The applicable Illinois statute set the maximum penalty for : 
the offense as $500.00 fine or one year in jail or both. 
-6-
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The defendant was convicted without the assistance of counsel 
and fined $50.00; whereupon he appealed, claiming he had been 
denied the right to counsel. The Supreme Court held: 
. the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to the United States Constitution require 
only that no indigent criminal defendant 
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment 
unless the State has afforded him the 
right to assistance of appointed counsel 
in his defense. 99 s.ct. 1162. 
Thus, the right to counsel in criminal proceedings 
does not extend to proceedings which do not result in the 
confinement of the accused. 
The Court in Scott reasoned there was a sound basis 
for drawing the line between those proceedings which result 
in confinement, and those where there is only a risk of 
confinement such as a fine. The Court stated at 99 S.Ct. 1162 
that "Actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from 
fines or the mere threat of imprisonment." 
Respondent asserts that the Scott decision and the 
analysis contained therein have application to juvenile 
proceedings. Because the considerations, stated above, upon 
which the Scott decision was based are analogous to the 
considerations present in juvenile proceedings, respondent 
asserts that the Scott decision should be followed in estab-
lishing the scope of the right to counsel in juvenile proceedings. 
Respondent submits that the due process clause of the 
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constitution only requires that no indigent juvenile be 
confined unless the state has afforded him the right to 
counsel. 
In the instant case appellant was charged with 
delinquency based on two felony counts of burglary in 
violation of section 76-6-202, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as 
amended. On January 30, 1980, appellant made a plea of 
admission to the charge. As a result of appellant's 
conviction he was ordered to pay restitution of $50.38 
and he was placed in the care of the Division of Family 
Services. The order to be placed in the Youth Development 
Center was stayed. Therefore, because appellant was not 
confined he was not denied due process by pleading guilty 
without the assistance of counsel. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO WITH-
DRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA BECAUSE APPELLANT 
HAD EFFECTIVELY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL. 
Section 77-24-3, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, 
provides that the Court anytime before judgment may withdra~ 
a plea of guilty and substitute in a plea of not guilty. 
(See also Section 78-3a-46, Utah Code Ann. (1953) .) However, 
this section does not give a defendant an automatic right to 
. . . thin the 
withdraw his guilty plea, but places the decision w1 
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sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Forsyth, 560 
P.2d 337 (Utah 1977); State v. Olafson, 567 P.2d 156 (Utah 
1977). This Court in Forsyth stated "the trial judge is 
allowed considerable latitude in the exercise of that 
discretion, which the appellate court will not interfere 
with unless it plainly appears there was an abuse thereof." 
Id. at 339. The facts of the instant case do not demonstrate 
that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the 
appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
First, appellant was properly instructed on his 
right to counsel and he effectively waived that right. It 
is well-settled that the right to counsel in a criminal 
proceeding can be waived by the defendant. Johnson v. Zerbst, 
304 u.s. 458, 58 s.ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); Von Moltke 
v. Gillies, 322 U.S. 708, 68 s.ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1947). 
The waiver of a juvenile's right to counsel in delinquency 
proceedings was established in Utah in State v. Spiers, 12 
U.2d 14, 361 P.2d 509 (1961). Johnson, supra, stated that 
whether a waiver has been effective in criminal proceeding 
depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case including 
background, experience, and conduct of the accused. 
In Spiers, this court likewise applied this standard 
to juvenile proceedings. Even though there is a presumption 
against waiver of the right to counsel, both Johnson and Spiers 
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I 
placed the burden on the defendant to establish he did 
not effectively waive his constitutional rights. The 
Court in Spiers stated: "the burden is on the defendant 
to show he has been denied his constitutional rights." 
Id. at 511. 
As already indicated, this Court in Spiers 
stated that the issue of whether there has been an effective 
waiver of the right to counsel depends upon the facts and 
circumstances of each case. In Spiers this court indicated ' 
that three of those factors were background, experience and 
conduct of the accused. The Arizona Supreme Court in Suiter 
v. Kurtz, 1 .h.riz. App. 348, 403 P.2d 3 (1965), reviewinq al~ 
year old juvenile's waiver of counsel, considered the followi: 
factors: age, education, literacy, prior courtroom experience,, 
financial condition, mental state, inducements, haste in 
proceedings, absence of relatives, complexity of charge, 
and knowledge of legal procedure. 
All of these factors should be considered in 
answering the question of whether appellant intelligent~•~ 
I 
voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Moreover, the burde:i 
is on the appellant to establish that in view of all these 
factors his waiver was ineffective. Appellant in his brief 
only focuses on his age, his father's understanding of the 
charges and the effect of pleading guilty, and the court' 5 
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instructions at the time the plea was made. 
Appellant recognizes that a juvenile can waive 
his right to counsel. However, he cites Williams v. Huff, 
146 F.2d 867 (D.C. Cir. 1945), which states that where the 
defendant is a juvenile, a rebuttable inference is created 
that the waiver of counsel is not intelligently made. In 
the instant case that inference is rebutted by the fact that 
appellant's father, who was present when the plea was made, 
concurred with his son that they did not want to consult 
with counsel. 
Appellant also claims that his father misunderstood 
the charges. However, it appears there is no objective proof 
to support this claim. The only evidence that appellant's 
father misunderstood the charges is the father's unsupported 
affidavit. Appellant further claims that his probation 
officer told his father that admission of the charges would 
clear the record and expedite the placing of appellant on 
the Tracker Program. However, appellant does not claim that 
this advice was incorrect or improper. These facts indicate 
that caution should be used in assessing the reliability of 
appellant's assertions. The New Jersey court in In Re State 
The Interest of R.M., 105 S.Ct. 372, 252 A.2d 237 (1969), 
stated that they would find that a juvenile had effectively 
waived his right to counsel if they were satisfied from the 
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---
circumstances that " ( 1) defendant knew he had a right to 
counsel; (2) he failed to avail himself of that right wi~ 
a full understanding of the implications and consequences 
of a plea of guilty; (3) he nevertheless submitted the 
plea entirely voluntarily." 
The facts of the instant case satisfy these 
requirements. On January 30, 19 80, the day appellant pled 
guilty, he was fourteen years and 9 months old. Present 
with the appellant were his father and his probation officer.' 
The charge against appellant was read and then the Court 
explained to him what the charges were. The court informed 
appellant and his father that he had a right to counsel. 
However, they indicated to the Court that they did not wish 
to consult counsel even after the court questioned them as 
to whether this decision was advisable. 
Finally, appellant makes no claim that due to lack 
of mental capacity or education he did not understand the 
proceedings, nor does he claim that fear, stress, or any 
other inducements influenced his decision to plead guilty. 
In short, appellant knew he had a right to counsel, and 
there is no evidence to show that appellant's plea was not 
intelligently and voluntarily made. 
Respondent asserts that appellant has not met hi5 
burden of showing that he did not waive his right to counsel! 
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intelligently. The juvenile judge, who was in a position 
to know whether appellant's waiver of counsel was intel-
ligently made, concluded that it was and denied appellant's 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Absent a clear showing 
that the trial court abused its discretion in denying 
appellant's motion, the denial should stand. 
Finally, appellant adds the additional argument 
that his waiver of his right to counsel was unknowingly made 
because the juvenile court judge did not advise him of the 
maximum possible penalty he might receive if he pled guilty. 
It must be stressed that appellant does not assert that 
his plea was involuntarily and unintelligently made on this 
basis. Rather he limits his claim to the waiver of counsel 
issue. Indeed, the right to counsel question was the only 
basis of appellant's motion to withdraw his plea in the court 
below. When viewed in this context, respondent re-asserts 
that because the maximum penalty of incarceration was not 
assessed in this case, appellant's right to counsel was not 
violated. Moreover, appellant's cases, to wit, State v. 
Banford, 13 U.2d 63, 368 P.2d 473 (1962) and Von Moltke v. 
Gillies, 322 U.S. 708, 68 S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309 (H47), 
become distinguishable. Although these cases establish that 
before a guilty plea can be accepted the Court must explain 
what the consequences of making that plea are, nevertheless, 
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there are notable differences between the instant case 
and Von Moltke and Banford, which operate against allowing 
appellant to withdraw his plea on that ground. In ~ 
and Von Moltke the defendants, after entering their guilty 
pleas, were sentenced to prison terms. Here appellant was 
only ordered to pay $50.38 restitution. Imprisonment is 
a penalty different in kind from a fine. A fine does not 
involve the serious intrusion into the life of the accused 
that imprisonment does. Where the accused may be imprisoned 1 
as a consequence of pleading guilty, it is critical that he 
be aware of that possibility because of the substantial 
impact imprisonment would have on his life. His awareness 
that he may be confined may substantially influence his 
decision to plead guilty. In the instant case, where appellar.:I 
was ordered to pay $50.38, and make restitution, there has [ 
not been a substantial intrusion into his life. 
The Court in Von Moltke stated that before a judge 
could discharge its duty the judge must investigate as long 
and as thoroughly as the circumstances in the case demanded. 
The facts in Von Moltke demanded that the judge make a 
comprehensive and penetrating examination of all the circum-
stances in the case. In the instant case, where appella~ 
was aware of the consequences of pleading guilty, the judge 
-14-
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discharged his duty by reading and explaining the charges 
to appellant and the father and by informing them of their 
right to counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that, where appellant was not 
confined as a result of his conviction, he was not denied 
due process by pleading guilty without the assistance of 
counsel. However, if this Court finds appellant did have 
a right to an attorney, respondent submits that an examination 
of the circumstances at the time appellant pled guilty shows 
his waiver of his right to counsel was intelligently and 
voluntarily made. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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